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Abstract 
Contemporary physics has shown that the universe is fine-tuned for life i.e. of all the possible ways 
physical laws, initial conditions and constants of physics could have been configured, only an extremely 
small range is capable of supporting life. Some theists have argued that fine-tuning can be used as a 
premise in a design argument for the existence of God, while some other scientists and philosophers 
have argued that fine-tuning provides an evidence for a multiverse, a hypothesis which claim that there 
is more than one universe. Both approaches assume that fine-tuning require some kind of explanation. 
Despite the initial appeal some philosophers and scientists have denied the need of explanation for the 
fine-tuning. They either deny that the universe is fine-tuned for existence or else think that we should 
not be surprised that universe is fine-tuned, and therefore should not search for explanation. In this 
paper we analyse some of these claims and try to show that neither of them succeeds in demonstrating 
that fine-tuning does not need an explanation.  
 
Keywords: Philosophy of Religion, Fine-tuning, Teleological Argument, Multiverse, Arguments for 
Theism, Naturalism. 
 
HASSAS AYAR AÇIKLAMAYA MUHTAÇ MIDIR? 
 
Öz 
Çağdaş fizik evrenimizin yaşam için hassas ayarlı olduğunu göstermiştir. Evrenin yaşam için hassas 
ayarlı olması demek fizik yasaları, başlangıç koşulları ve temel fizik sabitlerinin alabileceği muhtemel 
değerlerden çok azı yaşama izin vermesi demektir. Bazı teist düşünürler hassas ayarın Tanrı’nın varlığı 
lehinde geliştirilebilecek Tasarım kanıtlarında öncül görevi görebileceğini iddia etmişlerdir. Diğer 
taraftan bazı felsefeci ve bilim insanları hassas ayar gözlemenin birden fazla evrenin var olduğunu 
savunan çok evrenler hipotezini desteklediğini iddia etmişlerdir. Bu iki yaklaşım da hassas ayarın bir 
açıklamaya muhtaç olduğunu varsayımını yapar. İlk bakışta bu varsayım makul gözükse de bazı 
felsefeci ve bilim insanları hassas ayarın bir açıklamaya muhtaç olduğu iddiasını reddetmişlerdir. Bu 
yaklaşımı savunanlar ya evrenin yaşam için hassas ayarlı olmadığını ya da evrenin hassas ayarlı 
olmasına şaşırmamamız gerektiğini, dolayısı ile hassas ayarın bir açıklamaya ihtiyaç duymadığını iddia 
etmişlerdir. Bu makalemizde bu iddialarının bir kısmını ele alarak değerlendirecek ve hassas ayarın 
açıklamaya muhtaç olmadığını temellendirmede başarısız olduklarını göstermeye çalışacağız.  
Anahtar Kelimeler: Din Felsefesi, Hassas Ayar, Teleolojik Kanıt, Çok-Evrenler, Teizm Lehindeki 
Argümanlar, Doğalcılık. 
Atıf / Cite as: Doko, Enis. “Does Fine-Tuning Need an Explanation?”. Kader 17/1 (Haziran 2019): 1-14. 
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1. Introduction 
Teleological or design arguments are  form of argument which seek to demonstrate 
the existence of Grand Designer i.e. God based on some feature of the universe 
which seems to exhibit purpose or order. Teleological argument is one of the 
classic argument forms for the existence of God, and has been defended by many 
prominent thinkers such as Platon, Stoics, Ghazali, Ibn Rushd, Thomas Aquinas, 
Newton, Leibnitz; and criticized by Lucretius, Hume, Kant, Soren Kierkegaard. 
This argument was especially popular in Muslim thinking, since it seems to be 
suggested by many passages in Quran.  Therefore Ibn Rushd named the argument 
“Quranic argument” (the arguments from inaya and ikhtira).  
After the criticisms of Hume and Kant and rise of positivist critique of metaphysics 
the teleological argument lost its popularity. However, after 1970s the argument 
made a comeback in a new form. Physicists recognized that the universe seems to 
be extremely fine-tuned for the emergence of life. This new argument is not based 
in analogy and is formulable rigorously in Bayesian or abductive forms. In this 
paper we will analyse an abductive form of teleological argument, based upon 
examples of fine-tuning. After briefly reviewing the fine-tuning of the universe for 
life and the argument based on it, we defend the argument against the objections 
which deny the need for explanation of the fine-tuning.  
This article does not reflect an insufficiency in terms of meeting the standards of 
this journal to a certain degree. On that note its main argument is clearly stated at 
the beginning and the positions of some physicists are very well-exposed. 
However, the reader needs to be sign-posted about the flow of the argument. In 
particular, the reasoning behind the selection of these 6 objections to the fine-
tuning arguments needs to be made clear. The reason why the author chose these 
particular six objections is not clearly stated and also the reason why some other 
arguments are ignored is not contextualized. This is a major drawback since Derek 
Parfit’s article titled “Why Anything? Why This?” seems to be quite relevant to the 
argumentation demonstrated in this article. The author needs to consider the 
arguments provided by Derek Parfit within the context of the need to explain fine-
tuning. In this regard, the contemporary physicists’ observations with regards to 
the possible worlds, also, need to be addressed. Another minor point is that at 
times the arguments are not clearly exposed to the reader: for instance “Hospitable 
universes are special not only because they support life, but also because they 
alone exhibit attributes such as morality, aesthetics, consciousness etc. Thus it 
seems that fine-tuning requires an explanation beyond pure chance”. Another 
place the sense of argumentation needs to be made clear is the following: “Criteria 
5 is also insufficient: the maximum mass of the star should be greater than the 
minimum mass of the star. And Criteria 2, 3 and 5 are wrong - and of course many 
crucial criteria are missing”.  If, and only if, the author tackles these issues, I would 
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2. The Fine-Tuning of the Universe for Life 
A universe capable of sustaining life must be able to support beings which are able 
to reproduce and to store and use energy. These are necessary but not sufficient 
conditions for the emergence of intelligent life. Such conditions can only be 
provided by a universe exhibiting stable energy sources and a rich chemistry 
capable of yielding molecular structures, reproduction and the storage of energy. 
In the 1970’s - after classic papers by Carter1, Carr and Rees2, Paul Davies3and the 
extensive study of Barrow and Tipler4- physicists realized that the set of possible 
laws, constants and initial conditions of the universe conducive to the emergence 
of stable energy sources (stars) as well as chemistry, and therefore life, is extremely 
small. This was termed the ‘fine-tuning’ of the universe for life. Since 1970’s the 
examples of fine-tuning increased extensively5, and physicists and philosophers 
have sought to account for - or questioned whether we need account for – fine-
tuning. Our aim in this paper is to assess whether fine-tuning requires an 
explanation  
Examples of fine-tuning can be categorised three-fold: 
1. The fine-tuning of the laws of nature. 
2. The fine-tuning of the fundamental physical constants. 
3. The fine-tuning of the initial conditions of the universe. 
In the next subsections we will provide several examples from each of these 
categories.  
2.1. The fine-tuning of the laws of nature    
The first category of examples of fine-tuning are due to the laws of nature. Were 
the fundamental laws governing the universe different, the universe probably 
would have been sterile. To illustrate, let’s take the two of the four fundamental 
forces: 
Electromagnetic Force: Electromagnetic Force is a long-range force between 
charged objects. It is attractive for opposing and repulsive for the like charges. 
Mathematically it has a similar structure to gravitational force: 𝐹 = 𝑘𝑞𝑄 𝑟2⁄ , 
where𝐹 denotes the electromagnetic force, 𝑞 and 𝑄 are charge magnitudes, 𝑘 is a 
                                                          
1  B. Carter, “Confrontations of Cosmological Theories with Observational Data”, IAU Symposium, 
Vol. 63, ed. M.S. Longair M. S. D. (Reidel:Dordrecht, 1974): 291-298. 
2  B. Carr and M. Rees, “The anthropic principle and the structure of the physical World”, Nature, 
278, (1979): 605-612. 
3  P. Davies, “The anthropic principle”, Prog. Part. Nucl. Phys., 10, (1989): 1 – 38.  
4  J.D. Barrow and  F.J., Tipler, The Antropic Cosmological Principle, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986). 
5  For technical reviews of the progress in the field, the reader may consult: J. Hogan, “Why the 
universe is just so”, Reviews of Modern Physics, 72-4, (2000):1149-1161; L. Barnes, “Fine-tuning of 
the universe for life”, Publications of the Astronomical Society of Australia, 29-4, (2013): 529-564. For 
popular level presentations see: M. Rees, Just Six Numbers: The Deep Forces that Shape the Universe, 
(London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1999); P. Davies, The Goldilocks Enigma, (Houghton: Mifflin 
Harcourt, 2007). 
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constant determining the strength of the force, and 𝑟 is the distance between the 
charges. It is the force which holds negatively charged electrons around a 
positively charged nucleus. Thus, were there no electromagnetic force, or were it 
attractive for like charges, and repulsive for opposing charges, the formation of 
atoms would have been precluded. Thereby, we would have neither chemistry nor 
stable energy sources, and life would subsequently not have been possible. 
Strong Nuclear Force: Strong Nuclear Force is a short-range force that holds 
together the positively charged protons and neutral neutrons in the nucleus of an 
atom. Were there no strong force, or were it repulsive or weaker than the 
electromagnetic force, no atom but for Hydrogen would have formed. 
Consequently, no life would have been possible. On the other hand, were it long-
range (like gravity or the electromagnetic force) atoms would again not have 
formed, as such would have instead resulted in large, spherical and uniform 
structures. 
The fine-tuning of the laws of nature is not limited to the two fundamental forces 
discussed above. Other two are important as well, without gravity stars would not 
have formed, without weak nuclear force stars would not be able to form the 
heavy elements necessary for the rich chemistry. If Pauli exclusion principle did 
not exist, we would not have a stable atom and hence no chemistry. These are just 
representative examples.  
2.2. The fine tuning of the fundamental physical constants 
Even assuming our actual laws of nature, such laws do not guarantee the 
emergence of life. Besides the laws, fundamental physical constants must also fall 
within a narrow range of values. Here is Stephen Hawking and Leonard 
Mlodinow’s explanations of the fine-tuning of the fundamental physical constants:  
Most of the fundamental constants in our theories appear fine-tuned in the sense 
that if they were altered by only modest amounts, the universe would be 
qualitatively different, and in many cases unsuitable for the development of life. . 
. . The emergence of the complex structures capable of supporting intelligent 
observers seems to be very fragile. The laws of nature form a system that is 
extremely fine-tuned, and very little in physical law can be altered without 
destroying the possibility of the development of life as we know it. Were it not for 
a series of startling coincidences in the precise details of physical law, it seems, 
humans and similar life-forms would never have come into being.6  
Let us provide some examples of the fine-tuning of the fundamental physical 
constants.  
The cosmological constant (𝛬): This term arises from Einstein’s equation of 
general relativity and regulates the expansion rate of the universe. If it has a 
positive value, it acts as a repulsive force yielding the expansion of space; if 
negative, it acts as an attractive force contracting space. Quantum Field Theoretical 
predictions are 10120 times greater than the observed value - undoubtedly the 
                                                          
6  S. Hawking and L. Mlodinow,  The Grand Design, (New York: Bantam Books, 2010): 160-161. 
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greatest estimation error in physics. Hence, there must be some cancellation 
mechanism which matches with the quantum vacuum term in the first 120 decimal 
places, as explained by Weinberg:  
There may be a cosmological constant in the field equations whose value just 
cancels the effects of the vacuum mass density produced by quantum 
fluctuations. But to avoid conflict with astronomical observation, this cancellation 
would have to be accurate to at least 120 decimal places. Why in the world should 
the cosmological constant be so precisely fine-tuned?7 
If this cancellation mechanism matched one less decimal place with the effects of 
vacuum mass density, it would preclude life.8 As demonstrated by Weinberg, even 
a small increase in the cosmological constant would inhibit the formation of 
galaxies, and hence stars.9 On the other hand, were it smaller, the universe would 
have collapsed prior to the possible emergence of life.  
The Dimensionality of the universe (D): Our universe has three observable10 
spatial and one temporal dimension. This is the only combination capable of 
sustaining life. Had there been an additional temporal dimension no massive 
particle would have been stable11, and chemistry would thus have been impossible. 
Similarly, a difference in the number of spatial dimensions would have yielded the 
instability of atoms and planets12, rendering life impossible.13 
2.3. The fine tuning of the initial conditions of the universe 
The fate of the universe is not only determined by the laws of nature and the 
fundamental constants, but is also sensitive to its initial boundary conditions. And 
it tuns out that initial and boundary conditions also appear to be fine-tuned. Here 
is an example: 
The amplitude of primordial fluctuations (𝑄): This is the energy required to break 
up and disperse an instance of the largest structures - i.e. galactic clusters - 
expressed as a fraction of the rest mass energy of that structure. It is a 
dimensionless constant with the value𝑄 ≈ 10−5. Were it smaller than 10−6, gas 
would never condense into gravitationally bound structures, thereby inhibiting the 
formation of stars. On the other hand, were it greater than 10−5, the universe 
                                                          
7  S. Weinberg, The first three minutes: a modern view of the origin of the universe, (New York: Basic 
Books, 1977): 186-187. 
8  P. Davies, The Goldilocks Enigma, 166-170 
9  S. Weinberg, “Anthropic Bound on the Cosmological Constant”, Physical Review Letter, 59, (1987): 
2607. 
10  There may be unobservable small spatial dimensions as predicted by string theory. But presence 
of unobservable dimensions does not effect our argument, what matter is the number of 
dimensions felt by atoms. And even in string theory date number must be three as it is an 
experimental fact.  
11  J. Dorling, “Dimensionality of time”, American Journal of Physics, 38 (1970): 539. 
12  P. Ehrenfest, “Can atoms or planets exist in higher dimensions?”, Proceedings of the Amsterdam 
Academy, 20 (1917): 200-203. 
13  For more careful analysis of fine tuning of dimensionality of space-time reader may want to 
consult: M. Tegmark, “On the Dimensionality of Spacetime”, Classical and Quantum Gravity, 14, 
(1997): L69-L75. 
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would be turbulent and violent: in the early universe structures greater than 
galaxies would have formed which would not have fragmented into stars, but 
rather would have created giant black holes greater than clusters of galaxies.14Life 
would have been impossible in either scenario.15 
We should not that this is not the sole example of the fine-tuning of the initial 
conditions. Other examples such as initial entropy of the universe (S) can be 
provided.  
3. Fine Tuning as an Evidence for Theism 
The examples of fine-tuning outlined prompt the questions of whether they require 
explanation, and of what such an explanation may be. If one can show that fine-
tuning requires explanation, and that theism provides a comparably superior 
explanation than its alternatives, then we will have an inference to the best 
explanation type of argument in favour of theism. Such argument can be expressed 
in premises as:  
1. The fine-tuning of the universe requires explanation. 
2. There is a theistic explanation: that God designed the universe for the 
emergence of life. 
3. There is no comparably satisfying non-theistic explanation of why universe is 
fine-tuned.  
4. Therefore, the fine-tuning of the universe provides evidential support for 
theism.  
In this article we will concentrate on the first premise. The first premise initially 
seems very compelling. Given that an extremely small subset of possible 
configurations of physical laws, constants and initial conditions permits life, our 
universe’s membership of that subset seems very surprising. Nearly all the 
physicists and philosophers who are aware of the fine-tuning of the universe agree 
that this peculiar fact requires some kind of explanation. The prima facie need for 
explanation inheres in the magnitude of the improbabilities.  As explained above, 
for example, the cosmological constant must be set to precision of 1 in 10120. Let us 
try to imagine how small this number is. In one centimeter there are 100 million  of 
atoms, end every atom is composed of electrons, protons and neutrons. And there 
are billions, billons of stars in each galaxy. And our universe contains more than 
hundred billions of galaxies. Given these you can imagine how many particles are 
there in the universe. Therefore choosing one particular particle of this universe 
                                                          
14  M. Rees, Just Six Numbers: The Deep Forces that Shape the Universe, 115. 
15  For more technical and careful analysis of the fine-tuning of the amplitude of primordial 
fluctuations look at: M. Tegmark and M. Rees, “Why Is the Cosmic Microwave Background 
Fluctuation Level 10−5?”, The Astrophysical Journal, 499, (1998): 526.; M. Tegmark, A. Aguirre, M. 
Rees, F. Wilczek, “Dimensionless constants, cosmology, and other dark matters”, Physical Review 
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and getting it by chance alone seems impossible. But the probability of choosing 
some particular particle by chance is billions and billions of times higher than the 
probability of 1 in 10120. Given the improbability of even choosing one hidden 
particular grain of sand in a dessert randomly, we believe that reader can easily 
grasp how improbable   1 in 10120. And this is one among many fine-tuned 
parameters and laws. If the chance of having these parameters was, for example 1 
in 10, instead of probabilities like1 in 10120 , one could say that it does not require 
any explanation and probably nobody would make any design inference , but 
simply the odds are too much to ignore. 
Despite the initial appeal some philosophers and scientists have denied the need of 
explanation for the fine-tuning. They either deny that the universe is fine-tuned for 
existence or else think that we should not be surprised that universe is fine-tuned, 
and therefore should not search for explanation. Let us evaluate each of these 
claims.  
4. Pure Chance 
One frequent response is to deny the need for explanation by pointing to the fact 
that any other individual possible universe is equally as unlikely as our own. 
According to this approach, given that other possible values of constants are as 
unlikely as our own, we need not search for any additional explanation besides 
chance16. Consider the following analogy: suppose that Emre wins a lottery in 
which ten million people participle. Certainly, Emre’s winning the lottery is a very 
low probability event, but since any other person’s chance of winning the lottery is 
of as equally low probability as Emre's, we need not search for any special 
explanation of his win. Pure chance is enough to explain Emre’s winning the 
lottery. Similarly, this response continues, the fine-tuning of our universe may be 
considered the result of a cosmic lottery which similarly can be adequately 
explained as pure chance.  
We should agree that improbable events can be surprising or unsurprising. For 
instance, compare a monkey's typing of “To be or not to be!” to its typing of “e4 t5 
ghfdsfg 5%0”. Both are equally improbable in respect of having the same form – 
comprised of 19 characters each from a standard keyboard.  But the first sentence's 
meaningfulness is a special feature which renders it surprisingly improbable. Or, if 
we return to lottery analogy, suppose that Emre wins the lottery repeatedly 
(example 20 times), and that we come to learn that he is a good friend of the owner 
of the lottery. Should we not thereby be surprised by his individual victory and 
feel compelled to seek an alternative explanation than pure chance? Seemingly so. 
But fine-tuning seems similarly surprising. We ought to consider not merely the 
probability of our universe in contrast to other potential universes, but rather 
probability of a life-supporting universe in contrast to life-prohibiting universes. 
Given that emergence of life supporting universes are extremely unlikely in 
comparison to life prohibiting ones, and this universe’s turning out to be life 
                                                          
16  J. Koperski, Physics of Theism, (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2014): 66. 
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supporting seems to be very unlikely. First, like Emre’s winning the lottery 20 
times, our case seems to be one in which we have won the “cosmic lottery”  several 
dozen times, given that there are many independent parameters which could make 
life impossible. Second, a universe being hospitable to life seems a special outcome 
compared to inhospitable universes, as does Emre’s being a friend of the owner of 
lottery or a monkey’s typing of “To be or not to be!”.Hospitable universes are 
special not only because they support life, but also because they alone exhibit 
attributes such as morality, aesthetics, consciousness etc. Thus it seems that fine-
tuning requires an explanation beyond pure chance.   
5. The Weak Anthropic Principle 
Another means of denying the need for an explanation of fine-tuning is to appeal 
to the so-called 'Weak Anthropic Principle'. According to the weak version of the 
Anthropic Principle, if the physical laws and constants were not fine-tuned for life, 
we would not have been here to discover it. Therefore we should be unsurprised 
by the universe's being fine-tuned for life, for we could not observe any universe 
other than that which was hospitable to our existence. This is precisely what we 
should expect; therefore, no explanation of fine-tuning is required. 17 
This objection is now rarely defended, because it seems to be fallacious. Compare 
saying that a person jumping from the fiftieth floor and surviving the crush should 
not be surprised, for if he had not survived he would not have been here to 
question his survival18.  This is absurd: surviving the jump from fiftieth floor is a 
rare event which would definitely require an explanation. That a survivor could 
not question his survival had he not survived does not eliminate the need for 
explanation.  Similarly, what is surprising about our universe is not merely that it 
is observable by us, but rather the occurrence of a very low probability outcome 
that we do observe.  
6. Other Forms of Life are Possible 
One common objection to the fine-tuning argument is that it makes an 
anthropocentric assumption that only familiar life forms are possible. According to 
this line of objection, however, there may be possible exotic life forms in universes 
which we assume are inhospitable to life (Stenger, 2004: 177- 178). 
This objection is based on a misunderstanding of the argument. The argument 
does not make this assumption. As we discussed above, the basic assumption of 
fine-tuning is the claim that life can emerge only in the universes where physical 
conditions permit beings which can reproduce, store and use energy. These are 
                                                          
17  Barrow and Tipler, The Antropic Cosmological Principle, 1-2. 
18  A similar analogy familiar from the literature is Leslie’s Firing Squad analogy: J. Leslie, “How to 
draw conclusions from a fine-tuned cosmos”, Physics, Philosophy and Theology: A Common Quest 
For Understanding, ed. R. J. Russell, W. R. Stoeger and G. V. Coyne, (Vatican City State: Vatican 
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very minimal requirements for lifeforms. And these features can be realised only in 
universes where there are chemical elements for forming some sorts of molecules 
and stable energy sources. Thus the only assumption made by the defender of the 
fine-tuning argument is that life can only emerge in universes exhibiting stable 
energy sources. If the objector believes even these minimal conditions too 
stringent, he at least seems under some burden to expound upon the possible 
nature of such exotica. 
7. The Monkey God Objection 
Victor Stenger has objected to the fine-tuning argument on the basis of his 
'MonkeyGod' computer program.19 MonkeyGod is a program which chooses 
random values for the masses of electrons and protons, as well as the strengths of 
the electromagnetic force and the strong nuclear force from a given probability 
density function. He uses 8 different life-permitting criteria: 
1. The radius of the electron orbit should be at least 1000 times the radius of a 
nucleus.  
2. The energy of an electron in atom should be less than one thousandth of its 
nuclear binding energy. 
3. The fine structure constant should be smaller than 11.8 times the strong force 
coupling constant, ensuring a stable nuclei. 
4. Stars should have longer lives than 10 billion years. 
5. The maximum mass of stars should be at least 10 times greater than the 
maximum mass of planets. 
6. The minimum mass of a planet must be at least 10 times smaller than maximum 
mass of a planet.  
7. The length of a planetary day should at least 10 hours.  
8. The length of a year should be greater than 100 days.  
He deems the satisfaction of the criteria as necessary conditions for hospitability to 
life. Stenger claims that his program demonstrates that the emergence of life-
permitting universe is not unexpected.  
However, Stenger’s Monkey God is far from establishing that the universe is not 
fine-tuned for life. First, his model does not consider the fine-tuning of the laws of 
nature and the initial conditions of the universe. At most his code can show that 
the four parameters he uses (mass of electrons, mass of protons, and strength of 
electromagnetic and strong nuclear forces) are not fine-tuned. But even in this 
regard he fails. The criteria 7 and 8 are irrelevant: the length of a year or day is an 
unimportant factor effecting life in general. Criteria 5 is also insufficient: the 
maximum mass of the star should be greater than the minimum mass of the star. 
                                                          
19  V. Stenger, The Fallacy of Fine-Tuning: Why the Universe is Not Designed for Us, (Amherst N.Y: 
Prometheus Books, 2011): 233-244.  
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And Criteria 2, 3 and 5 are wrong - and of course many crucial criteria are 
missing20.  
This is enough to render his analysis incorrect, but even his probability density 
function is biased. He uses a logarithmic prior, overestimating the low values of 
constants where life is possible. Moreover, he centres his range around our 
universe, essentially making his model biased towards life permitting universes. 
Lastly his choice of cut-offs for the parameters seems to be arbitrary and not 
sufficiently high given that there is no limit to their possible values. Given this it 
seems clear that Strenger’s simple model is defective, biased and unthreatening to 
the fine-tuning argument. 
8. The Changing Single Variable Objection 
One further objection, again due to Victor Stenger, is that the hypothesis of fine-
tuning is based upon an analysis involving variation of one variable whilst keeping 
others constant: 
…the examples of fine-tuning given in the theist literature . . . vary one parameter 
while holding all the rest constant. This is both dubious and scientifically shoddy. 
As we shall see in several specific cases, changing one or more other parameters 
can often compensate for the one that is changed.21   
This objection is doubly wrong. First, even were Stenger’s claim that fine-tuning 
calculations are based upon varying single parameters correct, it would not follow 
that the fine-tuning hypothesis is misguided. Considering multiple parameters 
may and most probably will lead to bigger parameter spaces of life-prohibiting 
universes. Moreover, Strenger’s claim that only a single variable is varied, whilst 
others are held constant is clearly wrong. Most of the fine-tuning papers vary more 
than one variable. For example Tegmark, Aguirre, Rees and Wilczek's paper 
considers a 7-parameter phase space.22 23 
9. Normalisability objection 
Lydia McGrew, Timothy McGrew, and Eric Vestrup claim that the probabilities 
given in the argument for fine-tuning are formally incoherent because they are not 
normalisable.24 In order to understand this objection, let us start with a basic 
example. Think of a fair dice for which, given the Principle of Indifference, the 
probability of rolling any number is 1/6. Adding the outcomes probabilities gives 1. 
If all the outcome's probabilities sum to 1, we say that they are 'normalised'.  
Normalisability is a necessary condition of any coherent Kolmogorovian 
                                                          
20  L. Barnes, “Fine-tuning of the universe for life”. 
21  V. Stenger, The Fallacy of Fine-Tuning: Why the Universe is Not Designed for Us, 70. 
22  M. Tegmark, “Dimensionless constants, cosmology, and other dark matters”. 
23  For a more detailed and complete critique of Strenger’s work the reader may consult: L. Barnes, 
“Fine-tuning of the universe for life”. 
24  T. McGrew, L. McGrew, and E. Vestrup, “Probabilities and the fine-tuning argument: a sceptical 
view”, Mind, 110, (2001): 1027–1038. 
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probabilistic judgment. In general for any system, with 𝑛 equally likely outcomes, 
the normalized probabilities are given by 1 𝑛⁄ .  Whilst any probability with a finite 
range of variables can be easy normalized, infinite sample spaces (𝑛 → ∞) prove 
more problematic: 
Probabilities make sense only if the sum of the logically possible disjoint 
alternatives adds up to one—if there is, to put the point more colloquially, some 
sense that attaches to the idea that the various possibilities can be put together to 
make up one hundred percent of the probability space. But if we carve an infinite 
space up into equal finite-sized regions, we have infinitely many of them; and if 
we try to assign them each some fixed positive probability, however small, the 
sum of these is infinite.25  
According to the objection, the fundamental constants used in fine-tuning 
argument - such as strength of gravitational force or the dimensionality of universe 
- seems to be unbounded: that is, they can take any value starting from zero up to 
infinity. Given the Principle of Indifference (that all the possible outcomes are 
equally likely), the normalizability condition seems to be impossible to satisfy. If 
we assign any finite number (no matter how small) as the probability to the 
possible outcomes of these constants, we result in infinite total probabilities. On the 
other hand if we assign zero probability to all the possible outcomes, we end up 
having total probabilities of zero. Thus - the objection claims - since they are not 
normalizable, the fine-tuning argument’s main claim that life-permitting universes 
are extremely unlikely is meaningless.  
There are two possible replies to this objection. First, the defender of the fine-
tuning argument may reject the Principle of Indifference. In most of the real 
calculations of the possible ranges of the constants of nature an appropriate cut off 
is chosen, such that the values above this cutoff are assigned zero probability. 
Lydia McGrew, Timothy McGrew, and Eric Vestrup assume that only non-
arbitrary comparison for a physical constant is to take all their logically possible 
values. But there may be other non-arbitrary ways to compare them. One may give 
some physical arguments for restricting them to some finite range. Or one may 
choose a cut-off value, based upon the observation that the higher outcomes 
produce the same result. For example, if the strength of the electromagnetic force is 
greater than the strong nuclear force, then atoms with higher atomic numbers than 
hydrogen cannot be formed, because protons cannot be held at the nucleus. Hence 
physicists may choose to restrict the strength of the electromagnetic force with that 
of the strong nuclear force, and to calculate the fine-tuning of the strength 
accordingly. Or if the strength of the gravity is stronger than a certain value, the 
universe will collapse after the big bang prior to the formation of galaxies. One 
may thus want to restrict the strength of the gravity below the smallest value for 
which a universe collapses before galaxies are formed.  
                                                          
25  T. McGrew et al, “Probabilities and the fine-tuning argument: a sceptical view”, 1030. 
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Secondly, although McGrews and Vestrup do not openly state as such, they also 
assume the principle of countable additivity.26 The principle of countable additivity 
states that for any countable probability outcomes, the probability of any 
disjunction of these outcomes is equal to the sum of the corresponding 
probabilities of these alternatives. Whilst principle of countable additivity clearly 
applies to systems with finite outcomes, it is not clear whether it is also applicable 
to infinite probability spaces. Hence a defender of the fine-tuning may reject 
Principle of countable additivity instead of the principle of indifference. If the 
principle of countable additivity is not valid, then we can assign zero probabilities 
to each of the states and claim that the total probability nevertheless equals one. 
For example, assume we have a single electron in spatially infinite universe, if the 
velocity of the electron is completely known (hence it is in plain wave state) and its 
position completely unknown. The probability of finding this electron in any 
particular point in space will be zero. But nevertheless it will definitely be 
somewhere in the universe. Hence the principle of countable additivity seems to 
fail for the electron in infinite space, and therefore we can say that it also fails for 
the case of the fine-tuning of physical constants. Therefore, the normalisiblity 
objection fails.  
To conclude, the ranges of the fundamental constants can be restricted to finite 
sizes using non-arbitrary cut offs, hence solving the problem of the normalisability. 
If the objector is willing to press the objection and claim that all the cut offs are ad 
hoc, and insists upon an infinite range, the normalisability objection can 
alternatively be handled by rejecting the Principle of Countable additivity in cases 
of infinite equiprobable outcomes.  
Conclusion 
Modern physics has shown that the universe is fine-tuned for life: that of all the 
possible ways physical laws, initial conditions and constants of physics could have 
been configured, only an extremely small range is capable of supporting life. 
Despite the initial appeal some philosophers and scientists have denied the need of 
explanation for the fine-tuning. They either deny that the universe is fine-tuned for 
existence or else think that we should not be surprised that universe is fine-tuned, 
and therefore should not search for explanation. In this paper we analysed six 
objection which follow these strategies: the claim that pure chance can account the 
fine-tuning, weak anthropic principle objection, the charge of anthropocentricity, 
the normalisation objection and Strenger’s single variable and monkeygod 
objections. We tried to show that neither of these objections are capable of 
undermining the need for explanation of fine-tuning of the universe.  
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